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RECENT DECISIONS
CIL PROCEDURE - FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS - CHANGE OF VENUE
USE OF EXTRAORDINARY WRITS TO REVIEW AN ERRONEOUS 1404(a)
TRANSFER NOT CONSTITUTING AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. - Plaintiff
brought suit against defendant Railway Company in a United States
district court in Minnesota, where the defendant is incorporated. The
latter moved to transfer the case under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1952),
to the Western District of Washington, where the accident occurred and
where most of the witnesses resided, but the court, on plaintiff's counter-
motion, transferred instead to the Northern District of California. Section
1404(a) provides: "For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the
interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any
other district or division where it might have been brought." Defendant
petitioned the Court of Appeals for issuance of writs of prohibition and
mandamus under 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1952), to review the proceedings
and to compel a transfer to the district court in Washington. Section
1651 provides that "[A]II courts established-by Act of Congress may issue
all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions
and agreeable to the usages and principles of law." Defendant contended
that the district to which the case was transferred was not the one most
convenient and charged that the district court had erroneously exercised
its discretionary powers. The only connection that the Northern District
of California had with the action was the proximity of the district court,
located in San Francisco, to the hospital, in Long Beach, in which
plaintiff resided after the accident; the cause of action arose in Seattle,
in the Western District of Washington, and it is there that most of the
witnesses reside. Held, petition denied. An order of a district court
under § 1404(a) to transfer an action to another district court where suit
might have been brought is not reviewable by prohibition or mandamus,
although the order to transfer was issued through an erroneous exercise
of discretion. Great Northern Ry. v. Hyde, 238 F.2d 852 (8th Cir.
1956), aff'd on rehearing, 245 F.2d 537 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 872 (1957).
The rehearing was granted in the instant -case after the Supreme
Court had decided La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957).
In La Buy the Supreme Court held that a Court of Appeals has power
to issue a writ of mandamus where the reference of anti-trust cases to
a master for trial pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 53(b) amounted to an
abuse of discretion. The court in the instant case declined to apply the
La Buy doctrine upon rehearing because there was no abuse of discretion
but solely an erroneous exercise of discretion.
This case is the latest in which the federal courts have attempted to
determine the proper use of extraordinary writs within the framework of
judicial review. Extraordinary writs are to be issued by an appellate
court only in aid of its jurisdiction. Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319
U.S. 21 (1943). They are to be issued only where ordinary remedies
fail, Henderson Tire & Rubber Co. v. Reeves, 14 F.2d 903,'907 (8th
Cir. 1926) (dictum), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 744 (1927), or are clearly
inadequate, Bank Line, Ltd. v. United States, 163 F.2d 133 (2d Cir.
1947). Except under these conditions, a writ of mandamus cannot be
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made to perform the functions of an appeal. Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S.
258 (1947).
The problem in the instant case resolves itself into a question of
whether or not the traditional formulas should be abandoned in a
§ 1404(a) transfer case. There is a considerable divergence of opinion
concerning the use of extraordinary writs among the circuits with regard
to § 1404(a) cases. Great Northern Ry. v. Hyde, 238 F.2d 852, 856
(8th Cir. 1956). There is authority that the failure to properly construe
and apply the statute, or to consider the relevant factors incident to
transfer, renders appropriate the use of extraordinary writs. Ex parte
Chas. Pfizer & Co., 225 F.2d 720, 722-23 (5th Cir. 1955) (dictum);
see Wiren v. Laws, 194 F.2d 873, 874 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1951). The
Supreme Court has taken a definitive position that an erroneous exercise
of discretion is insufficient to invoke the use of extraordinary writs.
Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379 (1953). The
reasoning underlying this review is apparent from the Fahey case,
supra, at 259-60:
Mandamus, prohibition and injunction against judges are drastic and
extraordinary remedies. . . . [T]hey have the further unfortunate conse-
quence of making the judge a litigant, obliged to obtain personal counsel.
... These remedies should be resorted to only where appeal is a clearly
inadequate remedy. . . . As extraordinary remedies, they are reserved for
really extraordinary causes.
The divergence within the circuits concerning § 1404(a) cases appears
to result from contrary views as to what constitutes an erroneous exer-
cise of discretion as distinguished from an abuse of judicial discretion.
Since an exercise of discretion which is clearly erroneous ought to be
considered as an abuse of discretion, Nicol v. Koscinski, 188 F.2d 537,
538 (6th Cir. 1951) (dictum), the decision of the district court in the
instant case appears to be within the purview of the La Buy case, supra.
Since the majority in the instant case admitted that this case involved
a clearly erroneous exercise of discretion, 238 F.2d at 855, it would
seem to follow that this case falls within the "abuse of discretion"
test for which mandamus will lie. Furthermore, forum non conveniens
errors can be adequately reviewed only before trial, not afterward by
appeal. Gulf Research & Dev. Co. v. Leahy, 193 F.2d 302, 305 (3d Cir.
1951) (dictum). The logic underlying this statement seems to be that
if the petitioners lost in the court to which the case was transferred,
it would be difficult, if not impossible, to show that a substantially
different result would have been reached had the transfer not been made.
In terms of the instant case, the major question seems to be this: if
petitioner loses in the California court, how can it effectively show on
appeal the extent to which its cause was damaged by the hearing of the
case in California rather than in Washington? Many courts apparently
feel that a defendant cannot effectively show this, so that appeal from
the final judgment is inadequate. Ford Motor Co. v. Ryan, 182 F.2d 329,
330 (2d Cir. 1950) (dictum). The Bank Line case, supra, embodies
this "inadequacy of appeal" test. Significantly, the court in the instant
case, 238 F.2d at 855, also admits that in this case appeal from the final
order will be inadequate. It seems a defect in the judicial process to
admit the futility of appeal and yet to leave the party in a position
where his only recourse is to accept the consequences of a patently
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erroneous decision, and in the event of an adverse decision on the
merits, take an appeal where its inadequacy is settled in advance. To
hold that transfers such as the one here involved are not reviewable
until a final order has been entered, at which time it is virtually im-
possible to prove harm, is to give the district courts an unlimited power
to order or deny transfers without any possibility of effective review.
This danger should be indicative of the undesirability of the holding.
Finally, § 1404(a) authorizes transfers "in the interest of justice." Not
only is the error in the instant case an injustice by itself, but a more
serious injustice seems to be created by the holding that nothing can
be done to correct the initial injustice until it is too late to secure a
really effective correction. In addition to these considerations, § 1404(a)
also authorizes transfers "for the convenience of . . . witnesses." It is
difficult to see how a transfer to a district where none of the witnesses
reside rather than to the district where they do reside can be considered
a transfer "for the convenience of . . . witnesses." The decision in the
instant case frustrates the intent and purpose of § 1404(a) as regards
both justice and convenience, which would justify the issuance of an
extraordinary writ "reserved for really extraordinary cases." Ex parte
Fahey, supra at 260.
In short, the court in the instant case has apparently failed to apply
the exceptions to the general rule which the facts of the case demand.
The court's own admissions as to the existence of the error coupled
with the inadequacy of appeal from the final order, policy considerations,
and the purposes of the transfer statute as to justice and convenience,
indicate that this case should be brought within the exceptions to the
traditional rules concerning the use of extraordinary writs.
Richard D. Schiller.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - DUE PROCESS - EXTRATERRITORIAL PER-
SONAL SERVICE OF A NoN-RESIDENT IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF DUE PROCESS
WHERE THE NON-RESIDENT COMMITs TORT WITHIN THE STATE.-
Plaintiff's complaint alleged that defendant's agent, while delivering a
stove in Ilinois, negligently injured plaintiff. Defendant, a non-resident,
was personally served with process in Wisconsin, pursuant to the 1955
amendments to sections 16 and 17 of the Illinois Civil Practice Act.
The amended sections provide for personal service of process outside
the state on non-resident defendants who transact business, own property,
insure persons, property or risks, or who have committed tortious conduct
within the state. ILL. ANN. STAT. C.100, § 16, 17 (Smith-Hurd 1955).
Defendant appeared specially and questioned the constitutionality of
the amended statute. Service was quashed by the trial court. Upon appeal
to the Illinois Supreme Court, held, reversed. Assertion of jurisdiction
over a non-resident who has committed a tortious act within the state
and who has been personally served outside the state is not violative
of due process of law. Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 675
(1957).
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Historically the jurisdictional power of a state over non-resident defend-
ants has been limited by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment of the United States Constitution. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 1. A state's jurisdiction was limited to those parties over whom the
sovereign had physical control, Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
The Pennoyer doctrine was based on common law principles of physical
power. However, it is quite possible that the Supreme Court, realizing
the difficulties of travel and communication existing in 1877 and desiring
to protect non-residents from harassing actions within the state of the
forum, saw the practical necessity of limiting personal jurisdiction to
state territorial limits.
The necessity of physical control as defined in the Pennoyer case
was applicable only to individuals; corporations were treated differently
where service of process was concerned. A state could compel a foreign
corporation operating within the territorial limits to appoint an agent for
service of process. Initially appointment of an agent was based upon
a theory of implied or forced consent which distinguished between
corporations and individuals. Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18
How.) 404 (1855). This distinction was necessitated by the multistate
operation of corporations and the need to protect citizens of the state. The
implied or forced consent doctrine soon gave way to the presence theory.
The basis was no longer a fictitious consent but the legitimate interest
of the state in providing redress in its courts against corporations having
substantial contacts with the state and in favor of those persons entitled
to the state's protection. Barrow S.S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100 (1898).
As the jurisdictional concept regarding corporations developed, the
theory concerning individuals underwent important changes. The effects
of the Pennoyer case could still be seen in Flexner v. Farson, 248 U.S.
289 (1919), where it was held that a state could not assume jurisdiction
over members of a partnership transacting business in the state by serving
their purported agent within the confines of the state. However, the
principles of the Flexner case were repudiated in Henry L. Doherty & Co.
v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935), where it was held that a state could
assume jurisdiction over a non-resident partnership transacting business
within the state. Prior to the Doherty decision, Kane v. New Jersey, 242
U.S. 160 (1916), held that a non-resident motorist could be required
to actually appoint the Secretary of State his agent for service of process
in actions or legal proceedings caused by the operation of his registered
motor vehicle as a condition precedent to the operation of an automobile
within the state. Later in Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927), the
Supreme Court upheld a statute appointing a state official as the agent for
service of process and providing for notice by registered mail to non-
residents who utilized the state highways. The police power of the state
was said to validate the extraterritorial assertion of jurisdiction. Due
process of law was satisfied since ample provision was made for notice
and opportunity to be heard. Effective personal service outside the state
was allowed in Milliken v. Meyers, 311 U.S. 457 (1940), when the
Supreme Court held that the requirements of natural justice were met
when the state, by personal notification, served process on a domiciliary
who had left the state. Extended jurisdiction had thus developed to the
point where service could be effective beyond the borders of the state.
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Conceptually, jurisdiction has been broadened over the years to fulfill
the needs of a technologically progressive society with the resultant evolu-
tion from the physical presence, required by Pennoyer v. Neff, supra, to
that of substantial justice. "The liability rests on the inroads which
the automobile has made on the decision of Pennoyer v. Neff .... "
Olberding v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 346 U. 338, 341 (1953). The Court
provided grounds for the Nelson decision in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), by indicating that personal juris-
diction established through extraterritorial service would not be violative
of due process where the activities of the non-resident within the state
"establish sufficient contacts or ties with the state of the forum to make
it reasonable and just, according to our traditional conception of fair
play and substantial justice, to permit the state to enforce the obligations
which [have been] incurred there." 326 U.S. at 320. Thus, the Supreme
Court of Vermont in Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., 116 Vt.
569, 80 A.2d 664 (1951), upheld a Vermont statute similar to the
amended sections of the Illinois Civil Practice Act. The court followed
the minimum contact theory of the International Shoe case adding that
there was no violation of due process when sufficient contact made
bringing of suit in Vermont reasonable. The decision in Nelson v. Miller
is far removed from Pennoyer v. Neff, and is the most advanced stage
of an evolution necessitated by the technological changes that have made
travel and communication between the states commonplace rather than
unusual.
The reasonableness of the Illinois statute is apparent when one
realizes that the resident and non-resident are treated in the same manner
and that in any case where jurisdiction is asserted under the statute the
witnesses would most likely be in Illinois. While International Shoe Co.
v. Washington, supra, was concerned with a corporation, not an individ-
ual, and it did not grant jurisdiction upon the basis of a single act within
the state, the holding in Nelson v. Miller is within the spirit of the
enunciated doctrine, namely, certain activities within the state give rise
to personal jurisdiction.
J. M. Lynes
COURTS - JURISDICTION - OUTSTANDING COMMITMENT OF DEFEND-
ANT TO A MENTAL INSTITUTION NOT A BAR TO CRIMINAL PROSECUTION.
- Defendant was committed to A mental institution under court order
following an insanity inquest. After showing improvement, he was re-
leased from the hospital in the custody of his mother. It was during his
release that the defendant was alleged to have committed the crime of
second degree burglary. Before trial, the possibility of defendant's insanity
was suggested to the trial court; subsequently he was examined by court-
appointed physicians. At the preliminary hearing, the trial court deter-
mined from the medical evidence that defendant had sufficient compre-
hension to understand the nature and procedure of the criminal action,
and to make a defense, although no record of a formal restoration of
sanity was introduced. He was tried and found guilty. On appeal the
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jurisdiction of the trial court to hear the case was attacked on the ground
that the trial court, by entertaining the criminal charge, was permitting a
"collateral attack" upon the court order which committed defendant.
Held, affirmed; where a trial court has made an independent finding of
defendant's sanity, the fact that there is at the time of the alleged crime
and at the time of the trial an outstanding commitment of the accused to
a mental institution does not bar the court from taking jurisdiction. Marx
v. State, 141 N.E.2d 126 (Ind. 1957).
It is a time-honored principle of the common law that an insane person
cannot be tried on a criminal charge if at the time of trial he is insane
because he is not capable of pleading ". . .with that advice and caution
that he ought." 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *24; see In re Buchanan,
129 Cal. 330, 61 Pac. 1120 (1900). Consequently, where the issue of
insanity at the time of trial is raised, the court must determine whether
the defendant has sufficient capacity to understand the nature and object
of the proceedings, and the ability to assist in his own defense. See Ashley
v. Pescor, 147 F.2d 318 (8th Cir. 1945); United States v. Boylen, 41 F.
Supp. 724 (D. Ore. 1941). If a trial court tries and convicts an accused
who is physically and mentally incapable of making an adequate defense,
the court violates those certain immutable principles of justice that inhere
in the very idea of free government. Sanders v. Allen, 100 F.2d 717
(D.C. Cir. 1938); see also BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, supra. Thus,
to try an accused mentally incapable of standing trial would be to deny
due process. Even the prosecution may validly raise the question as to the
defendant's ability to stand trial, regardless of the objection of the defen-
dant. Cogburn v. State, 198 Tenn. 431, 281 S.W.2d 38 (1955) (statute).
Where there is an outstanding commitment of the accused to a mental
institution at the time of trial a problem arises due to the differing mean-
ings attributed to insanity in various phases of the law. The test to be
utilized in determining sanity is dependent upon the nature of the pro-
ceeding eg. United States v. Boylen, supra. In a civil case one may be
declared judicially insane (incompetent) where it is determined that he
has a mental disorder which renders him incapable of properly conduct-
ing his affairs, Browne v. Smith, 119 Colo. 469, 205 P.2d 239 (1949),
while in cases involving testamentary capacity it must be ascertained
whether the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time of the
execution of the will, In re Shields' Estate, 49 Cal. App.2d 293, 121 P.2d
795 (1942). However, a finding that one is competent to manage his
estate does not necessarily imply testamentary capacity, Emry v. Beaver,
192 Ind. 471, 137 N.E. 55 (1922).
An outstanding commitment to a mental institution raises a presump-
tion of continuing insanity, which must be overcome before the pro-
secution may proceed to trial. Perkins v. Mayo, 92 So. 2d 641 (Fla.
1957). But the presumption is not unimpeachable. The release of an
accused by the superintendent of the mental institution in itself, has been
held sufficient to rebut the presumption of continuing insanity. Brewer v.
Hunter, 163 F.2d 341 (10th Cir. 1947); but cf. Matter of Judge, 148 F.
Supp. 80 (S.D. Cal. 1956).
The strength of the presumption of continuing insanity may vary with
the factual setting. If a person has been judicially declared incompetent
as a result of a hearing arising from a criminal prosecution, it is erron-
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eous to try the accused in a subsequent criminal action until it has been
judicially determined that the accused is capable of standing trial, even
though there has been a medical certification of restored sanity. Gunther
v. United States, 215 F.2d 493 (D.C. Cir. 1954). Likewise a release
by a hospital superintendent is insufficient to rebut the presumption of
continuing insanity. See Taylor v. United States, 222 F.2d 398 (D.C.
Cir. 1955). The requirement of judical determination of sanity at the
subsequent trial is a reasonable application of the presumption in that
the person was committed to a mental institution because it was spec-
ifically determined he was incapable of standing trial. The same test is
used in both judicial determinations, whereas in other situations, dis-
similar tests of insanity give rise to a presumption which is not conclusive,
since the extent of mental aberration necessary to establish incapacity
may differ.
Since the use of any one of several tests to determine mental incom-
petence depends upon the nature of the proceeding, an adjudication as
to competency, or the lack of it, in one type of proceeding should not
be conclusive in another type of proceeding. However, if the present
judicial proceeding in which mental incompetence is claimed is identical
in nature with the prior proceeding, - the identical test of insanity
being involved in both proceedings - then the prior determination of
insanity should stand until overcome by an independent determination
at the subsequent proceeding that the disability no longer exists. This
results from the proper use of the presumption of continuing insanity.
An independent determination was made by the trial court in the instant
case, even though the prior commitment did not arise from the defen-
dant's inability to stand trial. This procedure, although not required by
precedent, is preferred when the trial court is confronted with the pre-
sumption of continuing insanity. It effectively rebuts any presumtion that
insanity exists which would bar trial. The presumption, having been
overcome in the instant case, the trial court properly asserted jurisdiction.
Harry Contos, Jr.
LABOR LAW-INJUNCTION-FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS MAY ENJOIN
NLRB FROM EXCEEDING STATUTORY AUTHORITY IN CERTIFICATION
PROCEEDINGS, - Plaintiff, president of an unincorporated labor organiz-
ation open to professional workers, petitioned the NLRB, requesting that
the union be certified as bargaining representative for designated pro-
fessional employees pursuant to section 9(c) of the Labor Management
Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 STAT. 143 (1947), as amended,
29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1952). Although petitioner desired a unit of only
professional employees, the Board found that a larger unit was more
appropriate, since there were 233 professionals and only nine non-pro-
fessionals and the inclusion of the few non-professionals would not des-
troy the "professional character" of the unit. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
115 N.L.R.B. 1420 (1956). The Board was asked, but refused, to direct
that an election be conducted in order that the professionals could deter-
mine whether they desired to be separated; the Board then ordered a
1958]
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representation election. Section 9(b) (1), 61 STAT. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 159(b) ( I ) (1952), specifically provides that the Board shall not decide
that any group is appropriate for collective bargaining purposes where
such unit includes both professional and non-professional employees
unless a majority of the professionals vote to include the non-profes-
sionals. The plaintiff filed a motion to stay the election. This motion was
denied; an election was held, under the direction of the Regional Director
of the NLRB, among the employees in the unit found appropriate by the
Board, including the non-professional employees, without the professional
employees having been given first an opportunity to decide whether they
desired to be included in such unit. A majority of the votes cast were for
the union and the union was certified as bargaining representative of
the mixed unit. Subsequently, a complaint was filed in federal district
court to set aside the election, enjoin the NLRB from further proceedings
contrary to section 9(b)(1), and to compel the Board to hold a pro-
fessional election as required by the act. Petitioner's requests were
granted. Kyne v. Leedom, 148 F. Supp. 597 (D.D.C. 1956). Upon
appeal, held, affirmed. Where the NLRB has violated a specific statutory
requirement resulting in injury to the plaintiff, the district court may
assert equity jurisdiction and compel compliance with statutory mandates.
Leedom v. Kyne, 249 F.2d 490 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. granted, 26 U.S.L.
WEEK 3204 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1958) (No. 633).
Generally there is no judicial review of any proceedings prior to a final
order by the Board as the courts are without jurisdiction. Fitzgerald v.
Douds, 167 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1948); American Twine & Fabric Corp. v.
Textile Workers Union, CIO, 96 F. Supp. 475 (D.N.H. 1951) (injunction
denied). See Switchnen's Union v. National Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297
(1943). The act provides judicial review through section 10, 61 STAT.
146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1952), generally limiting review to situ-
ations in which there have been final Board orders. In AFL v. NLRB,
308 U.S. 401 (1940), it was held there could be no judicial review of
certification proceedings, as such, since they are not final orders within
the meaning of the review provisions of the act. This decision was closely
followed by A.G.M. Workers' Ass'n v. NLRB, 117 F.2d 209 (7th Cir.
1940) in which a union asked that the Board be ordered to set aside its
order dismissing a petition for certification. The motion was dismissed
upon the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction. Here an aggrieved
party was denied judicial review both prior to and after a final Board
determination. "It seems to be thought that this failure to provide for a
court review is productive of peculiar hardships, which were perhaps not
foreseen.... But these are arguments to be addressed to Congress and not
the courts." AFL v. NLRB, supra at 411-12. In Madden v. Brotherhood
and Union of Transit Employees, 147 F.2d 439 (4th Cir. 1945), the
court refused to affirm a judgment granting injunctive relief where plain-
tiff was denied a place upon the ballot. Although it was contended that
the Board had transgressed its lawful authority, the court held that a
certification proceeding is not the equivalent of a Board order for review
purposes as it in itself brings about no injury. The court then concluded
that the subsequent election produced no substantial effect either upon
the emloyer or the employees, even though the petitioning union was
denied a place on the ballot.
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Several cases have indicated that where there is a substantial con-
stitutional question, the district courts may assume jurisdiction although
no final order has been issued. Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330
U.S. 485 (1947) (dictum); White v. Douds, 80 F. Supp. 402 (S.D.N.Y.
1948) (complaint dismissed on grounds that no substantial constitutional
question was presented and plaintiff had not exhausted administrative
remedies); Mechanics Educ. Soc. v. Schauffler, 103 F. Supp. 130 (E.D.
Pa. 1952) (complaint dismissed on grounds that no substantial con-
stitutional question presented, only an alleged error of law); Packard
Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485 (1947) (dictum); Westinghouse
Elec. Corp. v. NLRB, 236 F.2d 939 (3d Cir. 1956) (dictum). In Worth-
ington Pump and Mach. Corp. v. Douds, 97 F. Supp. 656 (S.D.N.Y.
1951), the district court asserted jurisdiction where due process was in
issue although the complaint was dismissed for failure to establish
irreparable injury. But it has been held that the district courts cannot
acquire equitable jurisdiction prior to a final Board order as other
remedies are yet available. Volney Felt Mills, Inc. v. LeBus, 196 F.2d
497 (5th Cir. 1952).
Other attempts to circumvent the review provisions of the act have
been unsuccessful. In International Union of Operating Engineers, AFL
Local 148 v. International Union of Operating Engineers, AFL Local 2,
173 F.2d 557 (8th Cir. 1949), the union sought injunctive relief invoking
section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 STAT. 243 (1946), 5
U.S.C. § 1009(a)(c) (1952). Section 10(a) provides "Any person
suffering legal wrong because of any agency action ... shall be entitled to
judicial review thereof," but section 10(c) affords review only of final
agency decisions. Certification proceedings are not tantamount to a final
Board determination. Ohio Power Co. v. NLRB, 164 F.2d 275 (6th Cir.
1947). Thus these sections of the Administrative Procedure Act are not
applicable.
The Supreme Court has indicated through dicta that equitable relief
is not foreclosed in all instances despite the failure of a substantial con-
stitutional issue; the power of the judiciary to compel an administrative
body to exercise its "duty" imposed by statute has been specifically left
unanswered. See General Comm. v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R., 320
U.S. 323 (1943), n. 12. This is the exact problem presented in the instant
case as the Board refused to comply with the specific mandate to hold a
professional election. Similarly, equitable jurisdiction independent from
the review provisions of the act was left unanswered in AFL v. NLRB,
supra at 412. It was said that the question "can be appropriately answered
only upon a showing in such a suit that unlawful action of the Board
has inflicted an injury ... for which the law, apart from the review pro-
visions . . . affords a remedy." See also Inland Empire Dist. Council,
Lumber Workers v. Millis, 325 U.S. 697 (1945).
It has been held that the district court possesses equitable powers, in-
dependent from the statutory review provisions, where the Board has
acted arbitrarily, capriciously and without authority in law, and the court
is satisfied that the failure to assert its injunctive power would result in
irreparable injury Thus in R. J. Reynolds Employees Ass'n, Inc. v.
NLRB, 61 F. Supp. 280 (W.D.N.C. 1943) where the petitioning union
was denied the effective enjoyment of their right to be placed upon the
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ballot in a representative election, the court held that the Board could
be enjoined from proceeding with a scheduled election. The failure to
assert equitable jurisdiction would have been to deny a remedy where a
wrong had been perpetrated by the Board since the plaintiff had "no
adequate remedy at law."
In situations involving the Board's statutory power concerning the
filing of non-communist affidavits, the district court's authority to assert
equity jurisdiction has been upheld where it has been determined that the
Board exceeded statutory authority. Farmer v. United Elec. Workers,
221 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 943 (1954). See
also Leedom v. International Union of Mine Workers, 352 U.S. 145
(1956). While the Board's action in preliminary proceedings is usually
not reviewable, equity may intervene where injury from an unlawful act
of the Board would continue unabated unless judicial relief was granted.
The prerequisites to judicial intervention appear to be an unlawful act of
the Board resulting from a transgression of statutory authority coupled
with irreparable injury to plaintiff. As to the former, the important dis-
tinction is departure from satutory requirements by way of transgression,
in contradistinction to erroneous exercise of administrative discretion or
an error of law. Compare Farmer v. International Fur Workers, 221 F.2d
862 (D.C. Cir. 1955) with DePratter v. Farmer, 232 F.2d 74 (D.C. Cir.
1956) and Madden v. Brotherhood and Union of Transit Workers, supra.
Leedom v. International Union of Mine Workers, supra, indicates that
the instant case was correctly decided. However, its effect is limited to sit-
uations where the Board has acted in blatant disregard of statutory man-
dates. In most "hardship cases," as in A.G.M. Workers' Ass'n v. NLRB,
supra, there will be no judicial intervention since it is clear that Con-
gress did not intend that there should be any judicial review of prelimin-
ary Board determinations. See 93 CONG. REC. 6444 (1947). To allow
such would be to frustrate the purposes of the act and subject the ad-
ministrative machinery to delay. However, "considerations of delay in the
bargaining resulting from direct review have no consequence where, as
here, the Board has acted outside the statute in frustration of the very
restraint placed upon it by Congress." Brief for the Appellees p. 18, n. 6,
Leedom v. Kyne, supra. The act should be amended to define a limited
area for judicial review of certain preliminary Board decisions where
administrative abuse has been flagrant - a study of the cases clearly
reveals that present statutory remedies are inadequate. At least, a partial
solution is forthcoming, certiorari having been granted in the instant case.
R. L. Cousineau
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS - IMMUNITY - MUNICIPALITY LIABLE
FOR TORTS OF POLICE OFFICERS UNDER RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR. -
Plaintiff's husband, while in a state of excessive intoxication, was in-
carcerated in the town jail and left unattended by the jailor. During the
night the jail became filled with smoke, resulting in the fatal suffocation
of the prisoner. Plaintiff's complaint against the municipality alleged
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negligence on the part of the jailor producing wrongful death. The com-
plaint was dismissed on the theory that the municipality was immune
from liability for the torts of its police officers. On appeal, held, a
municipal corporation is liable for the torts of its police officers under
the established principles of respondeat superior. In so ruling the court
expressly overruled established precedent to the contrary. Hargrove
v. Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957).
While corporate liability for the torts of employees is an accepted
principle of agency law, the municipal corporation has been accorded a
measure of immunity; it is a subdivision of the state which as a sovereign
is immune from all suit without its consent. Kennedy v. Daytona Beach,
132 Fla. 675, 182 So. 228 (1938). There is no logical reason why
municipalities should not enjoy complete immunity if they are sub-
divisions of the state, see Irvine v. Town of Greenwood, 89 S.C. 511, 72
S.E. 228 (1911). But municipal immunity extends only to governmental
or public functions as distinguished from proprietary or corporate func-
tions, since in the latter situation the municipality is operating in a
manner analogous to a corporation deriving private gains. Bailey v.
Mayor of New York, 3 Hill 531, 38 Am. Dec. 669 (N.Y. 1842).
Municipal immunity has been justified on three grounds. First, it is
based on a corollary of the ancient concept that the king can do no
wrong, Kennedy v. Daytona Beach, supra, but this is a fallacious argu-
ment in a democracy, see Madison v. San Francisco, 106 Cal. 2d 232,
234 P.2d 995 (1951), separate dissenting opinion, 236 P.2d 141 (1951);
furthermore, municipal immunity does not exist in England where the
idea that the king could do no wrong originated, see Hillyer v. St. Bartho-
lomew's Hospital, [1909] 2 K.B. 820. Secondly, it is said that the in-
dividual should bear the loss in silence rather than the entire citizenry
which ultimately would bear the loss through taxation. Taylor v. Wester-
field, 233 Ky. 619, 26 S.W.2d 557 (1930). But, extended to its logical
conclusion, this argument would call for immunity from proprietary tort
liability as well as contract liability. Thirdly, the possible liability to the
city may rtard city employees in the performance of their duties. Barker
v. Santa Fe, 47 N.M. 35, 136 P.2d 480 (1943). Rather than retard, it
should increase the efficiency of city employees for a city, fearing liability,
would become more selective in hiring and more conscientious in its
direction of employees. Miami v. Bethel, 65 So. 2d 34, 35 (Fla. 1953)
(special concurring opinion). Furthermore, it has never been advanced
that the liability that now exists as to proprietary functions has retarded
city employees in their performance thereof.
Practical application of the immunity, turning on the distinction
between governmental and proprietary functions, has resulted in con-
flicting decisions in similar factual situations. Hoggard v. City of Rich-
mond, 172 Va. 145, 200 S.E. 610 (1939). A charitable hospital operated
by a city may be "governmental," Kress v. Newark, 8 N.J. 562, 86 A.2d
185 (1952) or "proprietary," Kardulas v. City of Dover, 99 N.H. 359,
111 A.2d 327 (1955); a park operated by a city may be "governmental,"
Clark v. Louisville, 273 Ky. 645, 117 S.W.2d 614 (1938) or "pro-
prietary," Terre Haute v. Webster, 112 Ind. App. 101, 40 N.E.2d 972
(1942); and a sewer system operated by a city may be "governmental,"
GoIcher v. Farmersville, 137 Tex. 1, 151 S.W.2d 565 (1941) or "pro-
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prietary" Barker v. Santa Fe, 47 N.M. 85, 136 P.2d 480 (1943). The
ascertainment of the point of demarcation from governmental functions
is of increasing importance as city administration becomes larger and
more complex.
In the instant case, 96 So. 2d at 132, the court partially justifies over-
throwing municipal immunity with regard to the torts of policemen, upon
a guaranty of the state constitution, FLA. CONST., Declaration of Rights
§4, which provides that the courts of the state should be open to furnish
a remedy for every injury or wrong. In so reasoning the court assumes a
delicate position for two reasons. First, such a constitutional provision is
inapposite as an argument for creation of a new right or remedy as the
present existence of the right or remedy is a condition precedent to the
operation of the constitutional provision. Muller v. Nebraska Methodist
Hospital, 160 Neb. 279, 70 N.W.2d 86 (1955); Apitz v. Dames, 205
Ore. 242, 287 P.2d 585 (1955). But see Noel v. Menninger Foundation,
175 Kan. 751, 267 P.2d 934 (1954). Thus it may be posited that the
constitutional provision granting a remedy for every wrong or injury
does not create municipal liability since there was no legal right prior to
the instant case either at common law or by statute to recover from the
municipality when the tort was perpetrated by a police officer. See McCoy
v. Kenosha County, 195 Wis. 273, 218 N.W. 348 (1928). Secondly, the
court reasoned that the plaintiff's legal rights were invaded; therefore,
she suffered a wrong for which the Florida Constitution guaranteed a
remedy. However, her cause of action against the jailor for negligence
resulting in wrongful death was not impaired by the policy of municipal
immunity.
It appears that the necessary implication of the decision is that for
every wrong the constitution guarantees an effective remedy. Cf. Noel
v. Menninger Foundation, supra. To deny plaintiff a possibility of re-
covery against the muncipality in this instance is to deny an effective
legal remedy and leave the plaintiff with a relatively worthless cause of
action from the standpoint of monetary compensation. But the court,
anticipating the logical extension of the implication that effective remedies
are guaranteed, confined the decision in the instant case to the torts of
police officers, and reaffirmed existing immunity in the area of legislative,
judicial, quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial functions. Also the rule of
the instant case will leave unaffected the area of non-liability for torts
committed by state employees. The doctrine of the state's sovereign
immunity is much more firmly rooted than municipal immunity and will
not be as easily overthrown by judicial fiat. See Shaffer v. Monongalia
General Hospital, 135 W. Va. 163, 62 S.E.2d 795 (1950).
That municipal immunity is a creature of the judicary and not the
legislature supports the position of the court in the instant case insofar
as the court found it necessary to revoke established precedent in favor
of immunity. See Mississippi Baptist Hospital v. Holmes, 214 Miss. 906,
55 So. 2d. 142 (1951); Haynes v. Presbyterian Hospital Ass'n, 241 Iowa
1280, 45 N.W.2d 151 (1950).
The instant case is in accord with the modern trend to revoke the
immunity of religious and charitable institutions by judicial decision -
the immunity being contrary to modern ideas of social justice and
economic realities. Durney v. St. Francis Hospital, 46 Del. 350, 83 A.2d
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753 (1951) (respondeat superior applicable to hospital operated by
religious group); Foster v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Vermont, 116 Vt.
124, 70 A.2d 230 (1950) (privately conducted religious and charitable
institution not immune from liability for negligence or the maintenance
of a public nuisance); Ray v. Tucson Medical Center, 72 Ariz. 22, 230
P.2d 220 (1951) (respondeat superior applicable to privately operated
charitable hospital); Roman Catholic Church, Diocese of Tucson v.
Keenan, 74 Ariz. 20, 243 P.2d 455 (1952) (parochial school held liable
for injury to child as a result of employee's negligence).
The modern city is "big business." The majority of its operating
funds comes from excise taxes and revenue derived from "business"
activities such as the furnishing of utilities rather than taxation of the
citizens as individuals. In fairness such revenues should be subject to
invasion for the purpose of recompensing the individual injured as a
result of a city employee's tort no matter what type of function he was
performing. Miami v. Bethel, supra at 35 (special concurring opinion).
As activities become more diversified the greater becomes the possibility
that an individual citizen will have to bear the risks of municipal negli-
gence. To remedy this unjust situation, immunity should be denied, by
the judiciary if necessary, in the most flagrant instances, namely injuries
resulting from the torts of municipal employees. Separate dissenting
opinion, Madison v. San Francisco, 106 Cal. 2d 232, 234 P.2d 995
(1951) at 236 P.2d 141 (1951). However, municipal immunity is so
entrenched in precedent that any comprehensive treatment must come
from the legislatures.
Norris James Bishton
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